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Abstract: Vertical mergers are mostly perceived in the literature as a way of reducing production and transaction costs. 
However, vertical restrictions or raising rivals’ costs (RRC) are taken into great consideration by the antitrust authorities as 
potential consequences of vertical integration. The case of the French tuna industry seems of particular relevance to look at 
causes of vertical integration and the implications on competition within the industry. In 1994, a major fishing and 
transportation company has been taken over by a member of the French tropical tuna oligopoly. This company was 
previously supplying fish for all the canneries without earning extra profits. Since the institutional change, trade has been 
diverted and the company is now making substantial profits. With regard to this case study, one could hardly conclude that 
one of the oligopolists has developed such a strategy to intentionally raise its rivals’ costs. Efficiency and security of supply 
still provide a good explanation of the vertical integration decision. Nonetheless, uncertainty has been transferred from a 
competitor to the others after the acquisition. Whenever a risk of shortage occurs, uncertainty is increasing for the rivals, 
and the supplying costs too. Beyond the contribution of this case study to the conditions under which RRC strategy is 
rational for vertical integration decisions, the consequences for the French antitrust policy are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1984 US Merger Guidelines are reported 
several cases in which vertical mergers fall under the 
antitrust regulation. In France, vertical mergers 
undermining competition are also scrutinized by the 
antitrust authorities. In previous research, integrating a 
supplier is mainly explained by a cost reduction 
objective. It is widely admitted that economies of scale or 
economies of transaction costs are the underlying causes 
of vertical integration (Morvan, 1991 ; Perry, 1989 ; 
Sekkat, 1992 ; Williamson, 1975, 1986). 
 
A few works guiding the antitrust legislation have 
been carried out during the 1970s  (Chevalier, 1977 ; 
Jacquemin and Jong, 1977 ; Perroux, 1972) and more 
recent strands of research show that raising the rivals’ 
production costs by integrating a supplier remains a 
rational behavior (Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986, 1987 ; 
Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987). Since its beginning 
in 1983, the Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC) theory has 
received many criticisms that attempt to reduce its scope 
and relevance (Brennan, 1988 ; Coate and Kleit 1994 ; 
Granitz and Klein 1996 ; Lopatka and Godek, 1992). 
 
Therefore further research is required to determine 
the conditions under which a firm may increase its rivals’ 
costs by merging vertically with a supplier. On the basis 
of a detailed case study in the French tuna industry, we 
show that the integration of a supplier introduces a 
potential threat of raising supplying costs to the rivals. 
This threat comes true whenever a shortage of raw 
materials occurs. The result is a transfer of the supplying 
uncertainty to the competitors. First, it leads to re-
consider the issue of the vertical integration factors. 
Secondly, it addresses a question to the antitrust 
authorities regarding their ability to take this kind of 
competitive asymmetry into consideration. 
 
 
2. THE FACTORS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
The theoretical background of vertical integration 
(VI) has long been discussed amongst economists. Good 
syntheses can be found in many books (Morvan, 1991 ; 
Perry, 1989 ; Sekkat, 1992, Carlton-Perloff, 1998). The 
most recent ones define five motivations behind VI : to 
reduce transaction costs, to secure the access to a 
resource, to internalize an externality, to avoid a 
government tax or to increase the monopoly power 
(Carlton-Perloff, 1998). This paper will not look at these 
different motives. Let’s only note that the main economic 
reason for integration lies in a cost-benefit evaluation, 
whatever the origin of the costs : production (Stigler, 
1951) or transaction (Williamson, 1975). 
 
This last factor (reduction of transaction costs) is the 
most frequent principle that can be found in the recent IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
 2 
literature by authors who see the physical capital asset 
within the relationship between firms as the major 
determinant of vertical mergers (Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian, 1978 ; Weiss, 1994 ; Williamson, 1975, 1986). 
In this literature, the risk of vertical integration would 
have less to do with increasing co-ordination costs than 
with the lack of incentives to co-operate and to 
disseminate information (Grossman and Hart, 1986). It is 
nonetheless difficult to reduce the motives of VI to the 
mere goal of a more efficient organization. Some authors 
do not hesitate to address the traditional issue of 
Industrial Organization : efficiency or market power 
(Hart et Tirole, 1990 ; Sekkat, 1992) ? 
 
In that perspective, the recent controversy put the 
emphasis on VI as a means to do harm to a rival. 
Basically, the Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC) theory, 
introduced by Salop and Scheffman in 1983, has been 
often criticized and evaluated (Brennan, 1988  ; Coate 
and Kleit 1994 ; Granitz and Klein 1996 ; Krattenmaker 
and Salop, 1986 ; Lopatka and Godek, 1992). 
 
This theory tries to demonstrate that a firm may 
operate to raise its rivals’ costs by developing an 
exclusive relationship with the suppliers. This 
relationship covers a wide range of contracts, from input 
overbuying to “naked exclusion” (the supplier is 
committed contractually or tacitly not to sell inputs to the 
firm’s rivals) or VI of the upstream company (Brennan, 
1988 ; Perry, 1978 ; Schmalensee, 1973). 
 
The latter represents a way of catching market power, 
as shown in yet old articles under the name of “price 
squeeze” (Chevalier 1977, Jacquemin 1979). Such a 
strategy consists in vertically integrating a supplier that 
cannot be avoided by the horizontal rivals. The 
intermediate good is sold to the rivals at a higher price 
than the internal price fixed by the integrated firm. The 
latter can therefore fetch lower prices for the final good. 
The non-integrated rivals’ gross margins become 
“squeezed” between the higher cost of raw materials and 
the lower price of the final commodities so as to remain 
competitive. 
 
Many criticisms argued that the RRC theory does not 
add anything to the traditional theories framing the 
antitrust policy (Boudreaux, 1990  ; Brennan, 1988  ; 
Coate et Kleit, 1994 ; Lopatka and Godek, 1992). Indeed 
it is counter-intuitive as a firm hardly finds an interest in 
buying inputs at a higher price than those paid by the 
competitors. Furthermore, a supplier would hardly 
relinquish part of the demand (like in the case of naked 
exclusion). 
 
Nonetheless the US antitrust policy reports several 
cases in which vertical merger can be considered as being 
anti-competitive : whenever VI sets up entry barriers that 
foreclose non-integrated firms of the downstream market, 
or raises irregularly the rivals ‘costs, or refrains 
competitive behaviors either for the integrated firms or 
the rivals (Parker, 1998). 
 
In France, the 1986 antitrust Act (Ordonnance du 1
er 
décembre 1986), in its 4th heading devoted to restrictive 
practices, convicts for anti-competitive behavior those 
firms having discriminatory and exclusive practices when 
buying or selling products. Even when close relationship 
between a supplier and a customer is economically 
justified (Glais, 1995), vertical operations are likely to 
affect competition and therefore are carefully scrutinized 
by the antitrust authorities. A detailed case study of the 
French tuna industry sheds light on the circumstances 
under which competition is threatened. 
 
 
3. THE SUPPLYING CHAIN OF THE FRENCH 
MARKET FOR TUNA PRODUCTS  
 
As for many industries, the French canning industry 
has concentrated a lot for the last 20 years. It started long 
before because only 14 companies have survived in year 
2000 out of 250 plants existing after the second World 
war. 
 
Other moves have changed the nature of this industry. 
Production includes more processing of new species such 
as tropical tuna (yellowfin and skipjack) instead of 
former pelagic species like sardine or mackerel. Since the 
1950s, to seek after new raw materials has led companies 
to move abroad closer to the fishing zones (Côte d’Ivoire, 
Madagascar, Seychelles Islands). Most of the French 
production of frozen tuna is caught off the coast of these 
countries where it is landed (hence exported) for further 
processing by French-owned plants. Only a very low 
quantity of fish (less than 20%) is processed in France. 
On the other hand, most of the final goods are marketed 
in Europe. 
 
This short description of the value chain demonstrates 
the important role played by logistics in the supply of the 
French market, either with intermediate commodities for 
the processing plants (frozen whole or filleted fish), or 
with final goods (canned fish). As a consequence, the 
French industry has set up a few decades ago common 
facilities to carry (COmpagnie BREtonne de CArgos 
Frigorifiques - Cobrecaf) and sell (SOciété de VEnte de 
Thon COngelé - Sovetco) tuna products. The ownership 
of these two companies has been steadily disputed by the 
canneries. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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4. RIVALRY FOR THE CONTROL OF THE 
SUPPLYING FACILITIES 
 
Amongst the 20 surviving companies at the end of the 
1980s, the four biggest were Saupiquet, Pêche et Froid, 
Pêcheurs de France and Paul Paulet. At that time, 
Saupiquet was owned by Compagnie de Navigation 
Mixte on the stock exchange market, Pêche et Froid had 
a family structure of capital, Pêcheur de France belonged 
to the co-operative sector and Paul Paulet is owned by 
Starkist, the latter being hold by the big US company 
Heinz. These four companies represented three quarters 
of the 4 billion French Francs industrial turnover in 1995 
(i.e. about 600 million Euros). 
 
The four rivals were supplied for all or part of their 
inputs by Sovetco, whose majority of shares was hold by 
Cobrecaf1. The latter was founded in 1965 by André 
Delhemmes in Concarneau, major landing port of 
tropical tuna in France. The company is involved both in 
tuna fishing and freezing transport. In 1994, it owned 
directly or not a fleet of 7 freezing cargos and 13 fishing 
purse-seiners, employing some 433 workers (out of which 
390 sailors) for a turnover of 500 million FF (76 million 
Euros). 
 
In 1987, the capital of Cobrecaf is shared between the 
Delhemmes family (64%) and Starkist (36%). In 1988, in 
spite of an offer from Starkist, the members of the 
Delhemmes family sold their shares to the CFPM 
company (Compagnie Financière de Participation 
Maritime), this firm being equally hold by Pêche et Froid 
(Delpierre family) and Sopar-Cofibois (a fishing 
company) (Charneau, 1989). The capital of Cobrecaf had 
the following structure until 1993 (figure 1) : 
 
Starkist - Paulet Sopar-Cofibois Pêche et Froid
CFPM
COBRECAF
36%
50% 50%
64%
 
Figure 1 : Simplified structure of Cobrecaf’s capital in 
1993 
 
While the industry is facing a major worldwide 
demand crisis due to dolphin by-catches in tuna fishing, 
                                                        
1 The shares of Sovetco belong to a holding company 
(Sovetpar) in proportion of each vessel’s capital. For the 
time being, Sovetco is mainly hold by Cobrecaf and an 
independent tuna fishing company, Chevannes-
Merceron-Ballery (CMB). 
the Delpierre family, owner of the Pêche et Froid 
company, sold 58.44% of the shares in 1993 to 
OPTORG, holding company of the Moroccan group ONA 
(Omnium Nord-Africain). An anonymous charge was 
then laid against this operation on November 16
th, 1993. 
At that time, ONA was already involved in the industry 
through its association with the co-operative group 
Pêcheurs de France, one of the four biggest companies in 
France. 
 
The matter is submitted to the Competition Council 
(in charge of the implementation of the antitrust policy in 
France) by the Ministry of Economy. Referring to article 
38 of the 1986 Act, the Council stated that this 
concentration “did not bring a sufficient contribution to 
the economic progress to compensate the harmful effects 
on competition” (Conseil de la Concurrence, Avis n° 95-
A-1,  February 7
th, 1995). However, it added that “this 
acquisition could be authorized by the Ministry of 
Economy provided that the two companies Pêche et froid 
and Starkist are not in a collective dominant position on 
the national market of canned tuna through the control of 
Cobrecaf”. 
 
A steady dispute took place between Sopar-Cofibois 
and ONA about the control of CFPM. In July 1994, after 
several law proceedings, P. Le Flanchec, head of Sopar-
Cofibois, sold his shares of CFPM to Paul Paulet 
(Starkist). Unfortunately, the two new share-holders of 
the company (Starkist and ONA) did not get along either. 
The Quimper trade court decided the liquidation of 
CFPM. The Competition Council also asked Starkist to 
smooth down its position by selling part of its shares in 
Cobrecaf. In October 1994, 16 % became the property of 
the canning Italian firm Palmera. The breaking-up of 
CFPM was definitive in November 1995, as a merger 
between CFPM and Cobrecaf was accepted by the trade 
court of Quimper. At the same time, the Ministry of 
Economy, advised by the Competition Council, decided 
that Starkist and ONA could not own individually more 
than 36% of the new company. In order to comply with 
the Ministry recommendations, Starkist sold 18% to the 
US maritime transport company US Marine Chartering 
(USMC). The capital of Cobrecaf became : 
 
Starkist Palmera US Marine
Charterting
ONA
Cobrecaf
36% 14% 18 % 32 %
 
 
Figure 2 : Simplified structure of Cobrecaf’s capital in  
1996 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Interestingly, Starkist is one of the major customers of 
USMC and the latter could easily be considered as an 
allied in the board of Cobrecaf. The new breakdown of 
the capital gave the control of Cobrecaf to the US 
company Starkist. Moreover, after a long dispute with 
Starkist, ONA offered a gentleman agreement in 1995. 
This agreement resulted in a common strategy within 
Sovetco to sell frozen tuna (DGCCRF, 1995). 
 
This agreement was confirmed by the head manager 
of Pêche et Froid2, resulting in a new breakdown of the 
share-holders. In accordance to the judgment of the 
Competition Council, ONA was allowed to buy part of 
the USMC shares to reach the blocking minority within 
the administration board (another small part was sold to 
Palmera in the same move). The new share-holding 
structure became in 1998 : Starkist 36%, Palmera 16%, 
USMC 14.66% and ONA-Pêche et Froid 33.34%. 
 
One could easily conclude that Starkist-Paul Paulet 
took control over Cobrecaf after the law dispute of 1993-
95 and found an agreement with the minor share-holder 
ONA-Pêche et Froid in order to define the common 
strategic line of Cobrecaf. This line appeared to have 
affected the positions of both companies. 
 
 
5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROL OF 
COBRECAF BY STARKIST 
  
Since Starkist-Paulet became the decision maker 
within the Cobrecaf board, the economic results have 
increased significantly (table 1). The turnover had not 
stopped declining between 1990 and 1994, partly because 
of the falling prices of tuna, when it stabilized once after 
the conflict between Starkist and ONA. The 
improvement of the net result is even more outstanding 
since 1994. For the following years, it reached some very 
unusual values in such an industry. 
 
Once assured the control over Cobrecaf, hence over 
Sovetco, the two major share-holders Starkist and Pêche 
et Froid started to divest in France and to invest abroad 
substantially in processing facilities closer to the fishing 
zones. In 1994, Starkist closed down the cannery of 
Pornic in France and re-invested 10 million US$ in 
Ghana to modernize the PCF plant (Pioneer Food 
Company) shared with the local firm Mankoadze. The 
plant, whose production was stopped in 1987, was 
                                                        
2 In the Fishing newspaper (Le Marin, 20th November, 
1998), the chairman-director André Ferras said :  
“Starkist and Pêche et Froid managed to find a good 
balance. We both have the same interests”. 
thereafter expected to produce 30 to 40,000 tons of 
canned tuna for the European market. At that time, 
Starkist also took a 60% share in a big tuna canning 
factory on the Seychelles Islands. The firm announced a 
modernization plan of its new-controlled factory to 
supply the European market through Paul Paulet. 
 
ONA-Pêche et Froid undertook similar operations at 
the same time. First closing down its 20,000 tons factory 
of Etel (Le Bayon, France), the company upgraded its 
canning plants of Côte d’Ivoire to suit to the European 
safety standards and mostly to raise its processing 
capacity  up to 45,000 tons. The cannery was supplied 
both by the own fleet of the group (three vessels 
providing 40% of the fish) and by Sovetco for the 
remaining 60%. 
 
The lock-outs in France and the development of 
processing capacities in Ghana, Madagascar or 
Seychelles Islands were likely to divert trade flows of 
tuna products. For the time being, Sovetco does not sell 
any more frozen tropical tuna in France. In 1995, 30,000 
tons of fish were landed in Concarneau (France), falling 
down to some 12,000 t in 1996 and only 1,000 tons in 
1997. 
 
This new policy introduced a threat to the 
competitors’ supply. Except CMB which is marketing its 
tuna products through Sovetco, only two other fishing 
companies are competing on the French market : ACF-
Armement Coopératif Finistérien- and Saupiquet 
Armement, hold by Saupiquet. ACF owned 13 vessels 
mainly fishing for Pêcheurs de France, both belonging to 
the same co-operative group. Saupiquet used to be a full 
member of Sovetco for several years, when a dispute split 
up the structure for the first time in 1988. If the other 
companies re-joined the structure afterwards, Saupiquet 
never did. With six vessels, the company can supply the 
plants settled in France with tuna fillets and part of the 
overseas canneries (Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal), the 
remaining raw materials being bought from Sovetco. 
 
Consequently, the rivals of Starkist and ONA rely on 
the selling policy of Sovetco for part of their raw 
materials. This dependence does not create much trouble 
in case of  abundance. However, in the periods of 
shortage, Sovetco tends to supply first its share-holders’ 
owned canneries. Indeed, the logistics of Cobrecaf-
Sovetco has no equivalent in terms of price and quality 
(DGCCRF, 1995). The rivals must therefore buy fish 
from other trading companies at other conditions. They 
then have to face extra costs of supply. 
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Million  FF  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996  1997 
Turnover 237.4  188.0  169.1  152.1  128  132.2  133.2  122 
Net result   n.d.  -4.8  -2.3  +1.6  +33.4  +18.9  +19.5  12.0 
%  NR/T  -  -2.5%  -1.4%  1.0%  26.1%  14.3% 14.7% 10.0% 
 
Table 1 : Results of Cobrecaf, maritime freezing transport division 
(Source : CRCI Bretagne) 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Raising Rivals ‘Costs 
 
Cobrecaf-Sovetco used to work as common facilities 
for the whole French industry, just as non-profit 
organizations. All the canneries were able to use it more 
or less equally, except in a few reported cases3. This 
situation remained after 1988 and the new sharing of the 
capital between Starkist, Sopar and Pêche et Froid. This 
fragile balance was broken up in 1993 when ONA took 
over Pêche et Froid. 
 
This operation was the starting point of the conflict 
for the control of Cobrecaf between Starkist, ONA and 
SOPAR. At the end of the conflict, two major 
shareholders had the power, Starkist and ONA. Starkist 
was clearly the decision maker, and managed to get on 
with the minor share-holder ONA. Thereafter the 
economic results of the company recovered significantly, 
both share-holders divested in France and invested quite 
importantly abroad (Madagascar, Seychelles, Ghana). 
 
 
 
In case of fish abundance, the control over Cobrecaf-
Sovetco by Starkist has no direct consequence on the 
rivals’ supplying costs. There is no restriction of 
quantity, nor raising prices. Sovetco has no incentive to 
refuse to sell fish to some of the processors, because the 
latter would find frozen tuna without any problem. On 
the other hand, a scarcity in the Altantic fisheries would 
bring out a different situation : this new share-holding 
could affect the marketing strategy. 
 
                                                        
3 SAPAL, Senegal factory of Saupiquet had faced 
problems of supply all along the 1970s, partly due to 
unfavorable delivering policy of Sovetco (Charneau, 
1989, p. 49); ACF laid a charge against Cobrecaf-
Sovetco at the end of the 1980s after the latter had 
refused to carry ACF fish on its freezing cargos. Cobrecaf 
was finally discharged. 
 
Starkist can put the pressure on Sovetco and thus 
push the rivals to buy raw materials from other sources 
(mainly from the Indian Ocean), passing through other 
trading and transport companies (Sea Deal, Interpral, 
Secopa, etc.). Purchasing fish caught in the Indian Ocean 
increases significantly  the freight cost, thus raising final 
prices of the canneries4. In such a case, vertical 
integration would raise the costs of the non-integrated 
firms5. 
 
6.2. The Factors of  Vertical Integration 
 
The previous statement puts the emphasis on the 
causes of vertical integration. Clearly, the purpose of cost 
reduction lies under the decision of Starkist and ONA to 
take control over Cobrecaf. The development of 
production capacities requires supply security by 
internalizing a supplier that has no actual substitute on 
the market. However, such a monopolized control   
introduces a threat to the rivals in case of shortage. When 
it happens, the threat comes true and produces cost 
asymmetry between companies competing on the same 
final market. 
 
In other words, the case study shows that the two 
explanations of vertical integration are more 
complementary than substitutes.  When scarcity results in 
a greater uncertainty for the firms, a company is likely to 
secure its supply by integrating a supplier (Williamson, 
1975, 1986). If successful, this strategy introduces a 
threat to the rivals’ supply by increasing their 
uncertainty. Therefore an objective of production and 
transaction cost reduction motivates the decision of 
                                                        
4 A man in charge of buying fish in a Starkist’s rival 
company explained during a face-to-face interview that 
he faces some problems in supplying the factories in case 
of scarcity in the Atlantic Ocean. He then has to buy tuna 
from the Indian Ocean. “The extra-cost is estimated to 
1.20 to 1.30 FF per kilo ; if it is charged on 10% of the 
total raw materials, the overall cost is increased by 10 to 
20 centimes per kilo”, he said. 
5 Interestingly, Saupiquet took over the trading company 
Sea Deal in 1997. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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vertically integrate the asset specificity of a supplier. 
However, this decision finally results in raising rivals’ 
costs whenever a shortage of fish occurs.  
 
For a company involved in an industry where exists 
such a risk, two strategies may cope with it. The first one 
is to adopt a collective behavior with the competitors by 
setting up a joint supplying structure. This common 
organization may benefit to the whole industry by 
spreading out the costs of a potential shortage of raw 
materials to the whole industry. Sovetco appeared to 
work like this until 1993. 
 
The second one is more opportunistic because control 
over the late joint structure pushes the holding company 
to use it for its own interest in case of shortage, while the 
company still works in a common fashion in other cases. 
Sovetco appears to follow this line since 1994 and the 
acquisition of Cobrecaf by Starkist. 
 
 
6.3. The Implications for the Antitrust Policy 
 
The case study shows how vertical integration of a 
supplier has resulted in asymmetrical relations between 
the producers of canned tuna. VI is indeed the factor of 
market domination formalized by the RRC theorists 
(Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986, 1987  ; Salop and 
Scheffman, 1983, 1987). The features of domination are 
nonetheless fairly different from those stated by these 
authors. The objective is not to fully foreclose a 
competitor of the upstream market (naked exclusion), but 
to transfer the supplying risk previously supported by the 
whole industry to the sole competitors excluded from any 
property right on the supplier. 
 
One should note that the antitrust authorities have not 
prevented this transfer of risk, mainly because the 
consequences are not so detectable. The strategy is quite 
different from the more obvious price squeeze strategy. 
The latter says that control over a supplier gives higher 
prices of intermediate goods for the rivals as compared to 
the internal price of the integrated firm (Chevalier, 
1977). In the present case study, the price levels of raw 
materials bought by the canneries to Sovetco do not 
change, and follow pretty well the pattern of worldwide 
prices. On the other hand, what may change is the 
quantity sold through the organization to some 
processors, pushing them to buy somewhere else. The 
vertical restrictions are casual (in case of shortage) and 
represent only a small part of the rivals’ supply, making 
the strategy less perceptible and less condemnable by the 
antitrust laws. Such an observation then legitimates the 
control of vertical mergers by the antitrust policy, taking 
into better consideration the transfer of the supplying 
risk. 
 
More generally speaking, firms on a market are 
considered to comply with the competition rules as far as 
the competitive behaviors are fully autonomous (Glais, 
1999). It seems nevertheless difficult to ignore the 
interdependence of firms’ decisions, and mostly the 
consciousness of this interdependence by the major 
oligopolists of the tuna industry. More specifically, one 
should hardly consider that the firm undertaking to 
reduce uncertainty by internalizing a transaction ignores 
the consequences for the rivals in terms of raising their 
own uncertainty. 
 
The results of this strategy are clearly demonstrated 
by the commercial positions of the canneries after the 
vertical merger. The example of Ghana shows that 
French exports of frozen tropical tuna to this country 
(mainly marketed through Sovetco) have increased 
significantly since 1995. With this new source of supply, 
Ghanaian exports of canned tuna to France or the United 
Kingdom have increased substantially. The latter has 
started to substitute Ghanaian tuna in 1995 (5,000 t in 
1995, 12,000 t in 1998) for previous French exports to 
the UK which fell down to 2,400 t after taking off in the 
mid-1990s (5,800 t in 1995 and 7,000 t in 1996). 
 
The vertical control of the marketing chain by 
Starkist and the re-allocation of its investments, 
combined with the consequences for the rivals’ supply in 
case of shortage and the trade diversion on the European 
market, deserves greater scrutiny by the antitrust 
authorities. The whole strategy of the company has to be 
analyzed, even though the vertical merger only covers 
one segment of the worldwide market. A strategic 
decision should only be evaluated in a globalized context 
by the antitrust authorities as soon as the competitors do 
not restrict their competitive field to a single territory. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In recent works, various authors have attempted to 
demonstrate that vertical integration is sometimes 
explained by a willingness to do harm to the competitors 
(Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986, 1987  ; Salop and 
Scheffman, 1983, 1987). This research shows a more 
shaded result, as the reduction of transaction costs still 
appears as a good reason for VI. In the tuna canning 
industry, it is not possible to prove that the decision of 
taking over a supplier is planned to prejudice the rivals’ 
interest. The main reason seems to be the security of 
supply along with the development of production 
capacity. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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However, the vertical merger introduces a potential 
threat of raising costs which comes true in case of 
shortage of raw materials. Consequently this threat 
produces a casual asymmetry between the competitors 
according to the property rights on the supplier. The 
individualization of property rights, formerly hold 
collectively by the industry, has resulted in a new sharing 
of the supply risk, for the profit of the share-holder and to 
the detriment of other processors. Such an observation is 
not really taken into consideration by the antitrust 
authorities for two reasons. First, it is hardly detectable. 
Secondly, the worldwide field of competition between 
firms does not fit with the national enforcement of the 
antitrust policy. 
 
Possibly, similar strategies can be observed in other 
industries where a structural uncertainty frames the 
supply of raw materials, like in the fishing industry. This 
issue could be dealt with in future research work, in order 
to better understand how the control over a supplier may 
affect the downstream competition. Last but not least, it 
seems necessary to re-consider the implications of 
vertical integration within the antitrust policy in the 
context of globalization. 
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